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A B S T R A C T
Despite the fact that EU was acknowledged to ensure human rights protection level equivalent to
the one ensured under European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), it is doubtful if the EU
was able to ensure human rights in time of recent migrant crisis. It is argued in the Article that,
absence of comprehensive EU-level migrant policy restricted EU's ability to prevent the crisis
and to mitigate its consequences as well as human rights violations. In addition, being oriented
to ex post rights defense, EU's system was also practically unsuitable to defend the rights of the
asylum seekers after the violations actually occurred. It is proposed that EU should address
migration issues immediately by introducing major migration policy reform.
1. Introduction
There were several migrant crises in the European history already. 700,000 asylum seekers that Europe had to deal with after the
fall of the Iron Curtain (Connor, 2016). Before that, 60 million refugees during and after the WWII (Rothman & Ronk, 2015). Very
recently, following the emergence of war initiated by the Russian-backed separatists, 2.6 million of Ukrainian residents were forced
to leave their homes in Eastern Ukraine (Gienger, 2015). It appears that migrant crises tend to recur periodically in Europe. Given
the historical lessons, after the events in the Middle East emerged, migrant crisis could already be predicted, prepared for, and its
consequences (including human rights violations) could be signiﬁcantly mitigated. Should the European leaders have assembled
sometime before the crisis (after the Syrian war began, for instance) and decided on the most important issues concerning migrant
policy, the crisis could have been softened signiﬁcantly. However, although it could have been predicted, crisis has come as a
surprise.
While hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers travelled through EU's borders, EU leaders found themselves divided – some of
them shouted of the need for extraordinary measures,1 others threw accusations for not ﬁnding a solution at each other.2 At the same
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1 “Extraordinary times demand extraordinary measures,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel said” (Chicago Tribune, 2015).
2 “Till today, it was diﬃcult to ﬁnd a solution, because a series of countries adopt a stance ‘Not in my backyard,’ “Tsipras said.” (Chicago Tribune, 2015).
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time concerns of human rights protection, asylum and counterterrorism3 had to be taken into account. Indeed, tensions concerning
security had to be managed whereas rumors that terrorists were arriving to EU together with the wave of the asylum seekers
escalated. Although no evident connection between asylum seekers and terrorists was discovered (and even though evidence stating
the contrary were provided by the representatives of the United Nations4) hostile attitudes towards the incoming asylum seekers
emerged in the separate Member States leading to the internal division within EU. EU thus struggled to ﬁnd a cohesive, long term
solution (Ernst & Young, 2016, p. 1).
Following complicated negotiations between Member States the Commission only came up with several ad-hoc solutions to cope
with the crisis. Among other things, it proposed an emergency relocation of 160,000 refugees from Greece, Hungary and Italy,
creation of permanent relocation mechanism for all the Member States, creation of common European list of safe countries of
origin,5 making return policy more eﬀective, addressing the external dimension of the refugee crisis concerning the resolution of the
conﬂicts in Syria, Iraq, and Libya (Press release, 2015).
However, in their content, neither one of the proposals addressed additional safeguards of the rights of the asylum seekers while
waiting for the procedures to be completed. On the contrary, part of the solutions was meant to decrease the number of asylum
seekers that EU had to deal with (i.e. creation of the list of safe countries of origin, increasing the eﬀectiveness of the return policy).
The other solutions concerning relocation were only intended for logistical redistribution of people. By their very nature, these were
the short-term solutions primarily aimed for making it easier for EU and the Member States but certainly not for making it easier for
the actual asylum seeker.
Afterwards, the communication proposing the reform of Common European Asylum System was adopted by the Commission
(Commission, 2016). Based on this communication the reform of Dublin Regulation was proposed. Yet, on December 2016 the
reform regulation was still not adopted. Consequently, since the beginning of 2015 until the end of 2016 nothing substantial was
done by the EU to defend the rights of the asylum seekers ﬂowing to the EU. Thousands of asylum seekers are still held in the camps
often under degrading conditions6 (Alderman, 2016; Willsher, 2016). In turn, the EU is still stuck in the search for the long-term
solution.
Since EU was unable to provide a solution, incoming asylum seekers faced the EU immigration and human rights systems as they
are. It is currently undeniable that EU aspires to be an organization protecting human rights. EU managed to achieve such a level of
human rights protection, that it was acknowledged internationally, including the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) itself
(Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 (2005)). Already in 2005, the ECtHR managed to enumerate
features of EU legal system allowing it to conclude that protection of fundamental rights by Community law was equivalent to that of
the ECHR system.7 Despite all the positive characteristics implemented over time, EU's human rights protection system seemed to
be not eﬀective during the crisis. The purpose of this article is to assess whether the EU human rights system was able to eﬀectively
protect the rights of the arriving asylum seekers in recent period of crisis. It is ﬁrstly aimed to answer whether human rights
violations were or could have been prevented or at least reduced by actions from the side of EU. Secondly, in case actual violations in
fact occurred, it is analyzed whether an asylum seeker who consider his rights to be infringed, would be able to use the human rights
defense mechanisms in place after the violation happened.
2. Internal disagreements – an impediment for EU to introduce safeguards of the rights of the asylum seekers
EU, bringing together 28 Member States and a population of over 500 million, is certainly one of a few powers in the world that
can actually shape global governance. It has always declared its purpose to be seen in the world as a “single voice” (Postolache,
2012). Yet, being a complex organization aligning various interests of its members, EU is always in the process of searching and
discovering the common position. However, it is evident that EU met the recent crisis neither having a common position, nor being
united. As indicated in the report of Human Rights Watch “European Union and its member states struggled to develop an eﬀective
and principled response to the hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers and migrants who reached Europe. Narrow government
interests too often displaced sound policy responses, delaying protection and shelter for vulnerable people and raising questions
about the union's purpose and limits” (‘Human Rights Watch World Report, 2016: European Union Events of, 2015’).
Since no EU level solution was adopted, Member States took the matter into their own hands. While Germany chose to invite the
3 It is no secret that following the terror atacks in Paris on November 2015, Brussels on March 2016 and Nice on July 2016, as well as other smaller incidents in
various European countries, a considerable fear of terror exist among European population. It is often publicly claimed that by taking advantage of the migrant crisis
terrorists easily enter the EU territory (Nabeel & Bhatti, 2016), wherefore the migrants were started to be associated with a thareat to security.
4 “Mr. Emmerson, showed that ”while there is no evidence that migration leads to increased terrorist activity, migration policies that are restrictive or that violate
human rights may in fact create conditions conducive to terrorism.” (‘No evidence of risk’, 2016)
5 I.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey.
6 According to the European Commission on June 2016 50 000 of asylum seekers were held in camps in Greece only (Commission, 2016);
7 ECtHR stressed that fundamental rights have become a condition of legality of Community laws, that CJEU referred extensively to the provisions of ECHR and
case-law of ECtHR and that the Charter was substantially inspired by the rights protected under ECHR. The attention was drawn to the EU's intention to eventually
accede to the Convention (Bosphorus, para. 159). It was noted that these substantive guarantees of fundamental rights were also ensured by the mechanisms put in
place exactly to ensure their observance (Bosphorus, para. 160). First of all by CJEU's jurisdiction concerning the annulment actions and acts against Community (or
Member States) for the failure to perform obligations (Bosphorus, para. 161). An extremely limited standing of the individuals to initiate direct actions before the
CJEU was, however, noted as a drawback. According to the Court, actions initiated before CJEU by Community institutions or Member States constituted an
important control of compliance with Community norms to indirect beneﬁt of individual. In addition, the negative impact of the individual's lack of standing were
alleviated by remedies awarded by the national courts in connection with the infringements of Community law (Bosphorus, para. 162–163). Overall, ECtHR formed a
positive attitude to the EU's human rights protection system.
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asylum seekers to its territory and oﬀered them a shelter (Hall & Lichﬁeld, 2015), other states chose protectionist approach aimed
to limit the numbers of asylum seekers entering their territories as much as possible. Hungary, for instance, built a wall on its border
(Browne, 2015) and initiated the referendum to reject the migrant quotas imposed by the EU (Than & Szakacs, 2016). Czech
Republic was announced to be performing systemic human rights violations as a product of the oﬃcial governmental policy designed
to deter the asylum seekers. Measures undertaken included: subjecting asylum seekers (including children) to detention for 40 days,
or even longer - up to 90 days - in conditions described as degrading, not providing information about free legal aid8 and restricting
access of civil society organizations that work with refugees to detention facilities. Asylum seekers were even strip-searched by the
authorities looking to conﬁscate money in order to pay the 10 US dollars per day each person is charged for their involuntary stay in
the detention centers (“Zeid urges Czech Republic to stop detention of migrants & refugees, ”, 2015). Consequently, respective
asylum seekers were deprived of their rights to freedom of movement,9 liberty,10 right to family life,11 access to justice,12
education,13 employment,14 etc. There were similar restrictive measures applied in other Member States as well (Shields &
Preisinger, 2015). Respective violations were also documented by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) which
reported on the issues of children separated from their parents (“Current migration situation in the EU: separated children -
December 2016,” 2016), delays, overcrowding and lack of information that impinge on the rights of migrants (“Fine-tuning EU's
migration approach to better safeguard rights,” 2016).
Could human rights violations be prevented before they happened or mitigated by the EU? Could human rights protection be
ensured ex ante by adopting EU measures anticipating the instruments to deal with the upcoming stream of migrants or reacting to
the emerging crisis?
Considering that EU did not have a comprehensive policy comprising and balancing migration, security, counterterrorism,
external border protection, free movement of workers and other important issues, disagreements and division among politicians
with regard to most of these issues seems to be a natural outcome. EU disregarded historical lessons (which clearly indicate that
lingering armed conﬂicts results in massive displacement of people) as well as the most recent experiences (i.e. war in Ukraine) and
did not invest suﬃcient eﬀort into developing policy or action plan to deal with the cases of excessive migration. Making prompt and
decisive decisions in a “single voice” requires from the Member States to be at least in agreement as regards the questions of
principle, for instance, a common understanding that policies deterring asylum seekers from entering their countries were not to be
considered consistent with the values of EU. Migrant crisis can therefore be considered as migrant policy crisis whereas the absence
of comprehensive policy and the eﬀorts invested into coping with internal disagreements concerning the next steps between the
Member States determined that prevention of human rights violations became an issue of secondary importance.
Yet, even though a comprehensive policy was not in place when the crisis struck, EU could still undertake active actions
mitigating the violations of the asylum seekers’ rights as it was demonstrated on individual occasions. For instance, the activities of
the FRA surely had positive eﬀect on the development of the crisis. In response to the human rights violations FRA's representatives
were sent by the Commission to observe the respective camps where the asylum seekers were detained. Problematic issues, such as
initial registration and asylum applications, with particular attention to the situation of vulnerable people, child protection, access to
healthcare, racist incidents, are observed and overviewed on the weekly basis by the FRA providing useful information about the
nature of the rights violations asylum seekers experience in the EU (“FRA monthly reports on the migration situation,” 2016,
“Regular overviews of migration-related fundamental rights concerns,” 2016). Moreover, FRA is actively involved in the capacity
building and training of the staﬀ working closely with the migrants and that way is making sure that the staﬀ is at least aware of the
rights asylum seekers are entitled to (“FRA holds capacity-building workshop for migration hotspot staﬀ in Greece,” 2017). Indeed,
as far as managing crises goes, the role of FRA and other agencies (as well as coordination of the national police forces) should be
reconsidered as they could perform essential functions in mitigating the consequences (as demonstrated by FRA). They could, for
example, provide the asylum seekers with the initial information concerning the rights they are entitled to and the following moves
they could undertake that way providing an alternative for the information given by human smugglers and social media (Heijer,
Rijpma, & Spijkerboer, 2016, This p. 2). Clear deﬁnition of their respective functions would certainly contribute to softening of the
crisis and creation of a more eﬀective human rights protection system.
Considering the fact that there were already three major migrant crises in a less than a hundred years, it is time for EU to have a
plan how to handle migration in the future. There are plenty of signs already showing that active migration towards Europe would
not end with the current ﬂow. We still do not know when the current hot spots in Syria would be stabilized meaning that the ﬂows of
current intensity could continue for several years. Moreover, the population of Africa is predicted to increase from 1.11 billion in
2013 to 2.8 billion over the next 45 years. Combined with slow economic development, political disturbances, climate conditions it
would most likely determine an increase of the migration to Europe (Dustmann et al., 2016; Hatton, 2016). As the recent crisis
demonstrated migration problem can only be eﬀectively solved if addressed in advance. Consequently, EU must ﬁnd a consensus on
a comprehensive migration policy and its possible solutions.
8 Commissioner Zeid indicated that those migrants and refugees who have challenged their detention in court have prevailed, but most were not in a position to go
to court either because of the lack of information or assistance (“Zeid urges Czech Republic to stop detention of migrants & refugees, ”, 2015).
9 Article 45 of the Charter and Article 2 of the Protocol No 2 to the ECHR.
10 Article 6 of the Charter and Article 5 of the ECHR.
11 Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 of the ECHR.
12 Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 of the ECHR.
13 Article 14 of the Charter and Article 2 of the Protocol of the ECHR.
14 Article 15 of the Charter.
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Suggestions for a new regulatory framework to replace current outdated coordination attempts should be welcomed as a part of
new migration policy. As proposed by some authors, a reform should be based on two pillars. Firstly, a policy should be developed
aiming to secure European outer borders so that the ﬂows of the asylum seekers could be controlled. Secondly, it is suggested that
asylum claims should be dealt with before asylum seekers have (illegally) crossed into Europe. In addition, more equitable allocation
mechanism than the one anticipated under Dublin Regulation should be created (Dustmann et al., 2016). Moreover, a clear and
explicit understanding between Member States and EU should be achieved concerning the scope of their humanitarian
responsibilities, basic legal concepts and interpretation of their duties under Geneva Convention for Refugees (Hatton, 2016).
As the recent chapter has shown EU was not prepared to address and prevent the current migrant crisis since its actions were
hindered by the internal divisions and absence of comprehensive policy. Yet, EU has all the levers in its hands to get the migration
system ready for accepting the future waves of the asylum seekers. Introduction of the reform described in the previous paragraphs
could serve as a good starting point.
3. Ex post human rights defense system – hardly accessible for an asylum seeker
The second aspect that needs to be addressed in this article is the question whether an asylum seeker who considers his rights to
be infringed, would be able to use the human rights defense mechanisms in place after the violation happened. As already
determined in the previous chapter, various human rights entrenched in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter) were
potentially breached once the crisis emerged. Could the asylum seekers successfully use the Charter or the national procedures to
defend their rights? And whom should these violations be attributed to – EU or the Member States?
The question of attribution of responsibility under EU law is mainly determined by the scope of the application of the Charter.
Charter is applicable to the Member States as far as they are implementing EU law (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, 2010, Article 51). Indeed, during the migrant crisis most of the actions that allegedly infringed the rights of asylum seekers
were performed by the Member States. It was the Member States that detained asylum seekers, prevented them from entering their
respective territories, did not provide suﬃcient information or ensure due process for their rights defense. Yet, most of these actions
were performed acting in accordance with Dublin Regulation requiring to perform administrative procedures concerning the
admission and examination of asylum applications. In order to implement the requirements of EU law Member States had no other
choice but to detain the asylum seekers until the necessary procedures were ﬁnalized. Consequently, in principle, it is possible to
attempt proving that the Member States infringed the Charter rights in the process of execution of EU law.
On the other hand, it is quite hard to prove that any of the infringements were performed by the EU itself. Dublin Regulation
should not be considered as infringing fundamental rights just because it was not adjusted for the time of crisis and was useless in
dealing with greater numbers of asylum seekers. However, even if any of the alleged Charter infringements were attributable to the
EU, asylum seekers could not defend their rights due to the internal rules of the EU applicable to the individuals. EU human rights
protection mechanism was created for a calm and peaceful world, and was certainly not adapted to cope with the international
cataclysms or adjusted somehow for the asylum seekers.
Therefore, an excessively limited right to refer to CJEU on the basis of Article 263 TFEU to challenge EU law would be applicable
to the asylum seekers as individuals. Limited standing of the individuals to refer directly to CJEU results in the situation where they
are prevented from invoking the Charter against the acts of EU institutions. Not being able to challenge the EU laws directly, they are
practically deprived from the only eﬀective tool of rights protection. In truth, it is naïve to expect that a separate individual
(especially, if it is a natural person) would win a dispute against an international organization not being able to go to the single court
competent to annul the rights-infringing laws. Why is so diﬃcult for an individuals, including asylum seekers, to defend their rights
under EU system?
In theory, Charter should protect individuals and legal entities against actions of the EU institutions that infringe their
fundamental rights. However, the primary addressees of the Charter were always, ﬁrst of all, EU institutions that must adhere to its
requirements when legislating (Commission, 2015, p. 20). Following the amendments brought by the Lisbon Treaty, Article 6 of TEU
granted the Charter the same legal power as the Treaties (Treaty on European Union, 2016 O J. C 202/1). Hence, as a source of EU
primary law, Charter became directly applicable legal instrument as was acknowledged in Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62, Van Gend
& Loos, 1963). As a tool of primary law it can thus be used to challenge the legality of secondary laws due to the infringement of the
Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, as provided for in Article 263 of TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, 2016 O J. C 202/1).
There are primarily two parties that are concerned with the eﬀective implementation of the Charter. Firstly, it is the European
Commission that mainly oversees that the Charter is implemented and may initiate an infringement procedure in case the Member
State infringes it.15 Another party concerned – an individual whose rights are actually at stake in a particular situation. Where
individuals or businesses consider that an act of the EU institution directly aﬀecting them violates their fundamental rights as
enshrined in the Charter, they can bring their case before CJEU, which, subject to certain conditions, has the power to annul the act
in question (Commission, 2015, p. 21).
Yet, these conditions referred to in Article 263(4) of TFEU have been interpreted by CJEU in an extremely strict manner and,
15 European Commission may initiate infringement procedure, for instancce, if Member States EU law in a way contrary to the fundamental rights, public authority
applies EU law in a way contrary to human rights or ﬁnal decision of the national court of the last instance provides for an interpretation of EU law in such a way that
is contrary to the human right (Commission, 2015, p. 21).
S. Grigonis International Comparative Jurisprudence 2 (2016) 93–98
96
therefore, diﬃcult to fulﬁll for an individual.16 The situation is less complex if the individual is an addressee of the act in question. It
is evident in such case that the person is in fact aﬀected by the legal act. On the other hand, if the act is of general application
(regulation, for instance), an individual must prove that the act is of direct and individual concern for him. That is where all the
practical issues lies. As established by the case-law of CJEU, an individual seeking to challenge an EU act directly before CJEU would
have to demonstrate that the legal act in question aﬀected him by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to him or by reason
of circumstances in which he is diﬀerentiated from all the other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes him individually
just as in the case of the person addressed (Case C-25/62 Plaumann & Co. v. Commission [1963] ECR-95). The Plaumann-test has
been interpreted and applied by CJEU so strictly over the years so that the majority of claims brought by non-addressees could be
ruled out for lack of standing (Franklin, 2011, p. 147).
Having regard to the requirements of case-law of CJEU, an individual seeking to defend its rights infringed by the EU act of
general application would have to prove several points. Firstly, of course, that the act was not compatible with the Charter. Secondly,
prior to the point when it is allowed to deal with an issue of the existence of infringement, an individual would have to prove his legal
standing and demonstrate that the act concerned him directly and individually. Should the situation not fall under the restrictive
interpretation of these concepts, individual would be prevented from defending his rights before CJEU on the ground of
infringement of the Charter by the EU secondary laws. Even in case where the actual damage to the Charter protected rights
occurred. It is hard to imagine an asylum seeker, whose rights were infringed by EU legislation, applying successfully to CJEU and
substantiating his right to appear before court. Even multimillion companies, designating extensive ﬁnancial and human resources
to defend their interests, are unable to do so.
Whilst it has been stated fourteen years ago by CJEU itself, it seems that the following is as relevant today as before: “ <… >
according to the system for judicial review of legality established by the Treaty, a natural or legal person can bring an action
challenging a regulation only if it is concerned both directly and individually. Although this last condition must be interpreted in
the light of the principle of eﬀective judicial protection by taking account of the various circumstances that may distinguish an
applicant individually <… > such an interpretation cannot have the eﬀect of setting aside the condition in question <… > . While
it is, admittedly, possible to envisage a system of judicial review of the legality of Community measures of general application
diﬀerent from that established by the founding Treaty and never amended as to its principles, it is for the Member States, if
necessary <… > to reform the system currently in force.17”.
Although there were at least two possibilities (Nice and Lisbon18 treaties) to implement such an amendments and make it easier
for individuals to prove their standing before CJEU, no such amendment was ever adopted. Despite the oﬃcial position of the EU
(entrenched in the Treaties as well as in the case-law of CJEU), Member States are reluctant, or lack of political will, to empower
individuals with the actual leverage for human rights protection. Plaumann doctrine is still applicable today and results in the
situation where the asylum seekers, as well as businesses, NGOs and other EU's residents are very unlikely to prove their standing
necessary to challenge rights-infringing acts of EU institutions in judicial review procedures at the EU level (Pallemaerts, 2013, p.
33). Consequently, asylum seekers who consider their Charter rights to have been infringed by EU act, are very unlikely to defend
their rights ex post before CJEU. It is thus advisable for the Member States to reconsider EU regulative rules concerning individual's
standing before CJEU by making it easier for an individuals to access the court.19
As far as procedures under national laws are concerned, it is rather promising way of rights defense. As was indicated in the
human rights commissioner's Zeid's report concerning the violations in Czech Republic, those asylum seekers and refugees who have
challenged their detention in court received decisions in favor. However, it was stressed that most of the detainees were not in a
position to go to court because of the lack of information about the fact that a free of charge legal assistance was available or because
civil society organizations that worked with refugees were receiving very restricted access to detention facilities (“Zeid urges Czech
Republic to stop detention of migrants & refugees, ”, 2015). Indeed, most of the arriving asylum seekers lack information
concerning the legal systems of the accepting Member States and the rights they are entitled to. Moreover, a language barrier exists
in many cases that could also impede the asylum seekers from defending their respective rights. Although asylum seekers are entitled
to translation, qualiﬁed on-site translation is hard to get even on normal ‘non-crisis’ circumstances. And even if they had the
necessary information, lacking ﬁnancial resources (as is the case with regard to majority of detainees) and not being able to receive
free legal aid, they would still be unable to initiate their rights defense. Consequently, although national human rights defense
mechanisms could potentially be used quite eﬀectively, many obstacles prevent the asylum seekers from using it.
Even so, if the violations of asylum seekers rights were considered attributable (under Charter, national law or ECHR) to the respective
Member States, the possibility to initiate the collective action by the groups of asylum seekers whose rights were infringed could be
theoretically implemented before the courts of certain Member States and before ECtHR. Such a method of rights defense could serve as a
solution allowing to overcome limited ﬁnancial resources and to represent the interests of larger groups of the asylum seekers.
16 The question of standing of the individual to initiate direct action before CJEU is not a new problem among the EU-law scholars. It was as relevant 50 years ago,
as it is today (Angulo & Dawson, 1967, p. 608). Yet, an issue of individual's standing before CJEU was never solved.
17 Emphasis added by the author.
18 Even though the concept of “regulatory act which is of direct concern <… > and does not entail implementing measures” was introduced in Treaty of Lisbon
with a purpose of making it easier for the individuals to defend their rights directly, the concept of such regulatory act was not clear up until recently. In its judgement
in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatim General Court clariﬁed that ‘regulatory acts’ must be understood as covering all acts of general application apart from legislative acts (Case
T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami [2011] ECR 11–75). Such interpretation was conﬁrmed by the Court of Justice in 2013 (Case C-583/11P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami
[2013] ECLI: EU:C:2013:625, para. 60).
19 In addition, from the theoretical point of view, a possibility to invoke Article 265 TFEU (by claiming an omission on part of EU for not enacting timely measures
to terminate human rights violations) seems to be an interesting alternative way of asylum seeker's rights defense that could potentially be further considered.
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4. Conclusions
Absence of comprehensive migrant policy at the EU level determined that EU welcomed the crisis being divided and indecisive,
despite the fact that having regard to the historical experience crisis could be anticipated and most of the human rights violations
avoided. Although most of the infringements of the asylum seekers’ rights should probably be attributed to the Member States, due
to the internal disagreements EU did not do much to mitigate the violations as well. As far as managing crises goes, the role of FRA
and other EU agencies (as well as coordination of the national police forces) should be reconsidered and clearly deﬁned as these
institutions could perform essential functions in ensuring human rights protection in time of crisis. It is suggested in the Article that
upcoming crises concerning migration could only be prevented and mitigated by addressing the issue of migration policy
immediately. Securing European outer borders, reforming asylum claims processing system so that they would be dealt with before
the person arrives to the EU, reaching explicit understanding between Member States and EU concerning the scope of their
humanitarian responsibilities should be among the pillars of the migration policy reform. Finally, it is suggested that the conditions
necessary to prove the standing of the individuals before CJEU should be reconsidered and alleviated to make human rights
protection more accessible.
References
Alderman, L. (2016). Aid and Attention Dwindling, Migrant Crisis intensiﬁes in Greece. Retrieved from 〈http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/world/europe/
migrant-crisis-greece.html〉.
Angulo, M. R., & Dawson, F. G. (1967). Access by Natural and Legal Persons to the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 36. University of Cincinnati Law
Review, 583–649.
Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm V. (2005). Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 (ECtHR.
Browne, R. (2015). Hungary Is Building a Wall Along the Serbian Border to Keep Migrants Out. Retrieved from 〈https://news.vice.com/article/hungary-is-building-
a-wall-along-the-serbian-border-to-keep-migrants-out〉.
Case 26/62 (1963). NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [] ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
Case C-25/62 (1963). Plaumann & Co. v. Commission [] ECR-95.
Case C-583/11 (2013). P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [] ECLI:EU:C:2013:625.
Case T-18/10 (2011). Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council [] ECR 11-75.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010). O.J. C 83.
Connor, P. (2016). Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015. Retrieved from 〈http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-
refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/〉.
Consolidated (2016). versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union O.J. C 202/1.
Dustmann, C., Fasani, F., Frattini, T., Minale, L., & Schӧnberg, U. (2016). On the economics and politics of refugee migration. Retrieved from 〈http://voxeu.org/
article/economics-and-politics-refugee-migration〉.
Ernst & Young (2016). Managing the EU migration crisis From panic to planning. Retrieved from 〈http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-managing-the-
eu-migration-crisis/%24FILE/ey-managing-the-eu-migration-crisis.pdf〉.
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2016a). Current migration situation in the EU: separated children - December 2016. Retrieved from 〈http://fra.
europa.eu/en/publication/2016/december-monthly-migration-focus-separated-children〉.
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2016b). Regular overviews of migration-related fundamental rights concerns. Retrieved from 〈http://fra.europa.
eu/en/theme/asylum-migration-borders/overviews〉.
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2016c). Fine-tuning EU’s migration approach to better safeguard rights. Retrieved from 〈http://fra.europa.eu/en/
news/2016/ﬁne-tuning-eus-migration-approach-better-safeguard-rights〉.
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2017). FRA holds capacity-building workshop for migration hotspot staﬀ in Greece. Retrieved from 〈http://fra.
europa.eu/en/news/2017/fra-holds-capacity-building-workshop-migration-hotspot-staﬀ-greece〉.
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2016d). FRA monthly reports on the migration situation. Retrieved from 〈http://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2016/fra-
monthly-reports-migration-situation〉.
Franklin, C. (2011). The legal status of the EU Charter of fundamental Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon. Tilburg Law Review, 15, 137–162.
Gienger, V. (2015). Ukraine’s Invisible Crisis: 1.5 Million Who Fled War With Russia. Retrieved from 〈https://www.usip.org/olivebranch/2015/11/23/ukraines-
invisible-crisis-15-million-who-ﬂed-war-russia〉.
Hall, A., & Lichﬁeld, J. (2015). Germany opens its gates: Berlin says all Syrian asylum-seekers are welcome to remain, as Britain is urged to make a similar statement.
Retrieved from 〈http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-opens-its-gates-berlin-says-all-syrian-asylum-seekers-are-welcome-to-remain-as-
britain-is-10470062.html〉.
Hatton, T. (2016). The migration crisis and refugee policy in Europe. Retrieved from 〈http://voxeu.org/article/migration-crisis-and-refugee-policy-europe〉.
Heijer, M. den, Rijpma, J., & Spijkerboer, T. (2016). Coercion, prohibition, and great expectations: The continuing failure of the Common European Asylum System.
Common Market Law Review, 53(3), 607–642.
Human Rights Watch World Report 2016: European Union Events of (2015). (n.d.). Retrieved from 〈https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/
european-union-0〉.
Nabeel, G., & Bhatti, J. (2016). Refugees in Europe say they fear terrorists are among them. Retrieved from 〈http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/07/
14/refugees-europe-say-they-fear-terrorists-among-them/87008334/〉.
Pallemaerts, M. (2013). Environmental human Rights: Is the EU a leader, a follower, or a laggard? Oregon Review of International Law, 15, 7–41.
Postolache, A. (2012). The power of a single voice: The EU's contribution to Global governance architecture. Romanian Journal of European Aﬀairs, 12, 3.
Tribune wire reports (2015). EU leaders criticize each other at summit on migrants. Retrieved from 〈http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-europe-
migrants-20151025-story.html〉.
Rothman, L., & Ronk, L. (2015). This Is What Europe’s Last Major Refugee Crisis Looked Like. Retrieved from 〈http://time.com/4029800/world-war-ii-refugee-
photos-migrant-crisis/〉.
Shields, M., & Preisinger, I. (2015). Austria plans to end measures allowing migrants from Hungary and move towards normality. Retrieved from 〈http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-idUSKCN0R40FO20150907〉.
Than, K., & Szakacs, G. (2016). Hungarians vote to reject migrant quotas, but turnout too low to be valid. Retrieved from 〈http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
europe-migrants-hungary-referendum-idUSKCN1213Q3〉.
Willsher, K. (2016). Protesters close Calais over refugee crisis: We are not racist but we see no solution. Retrieved from 〈https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
sep/05/calais-residents-protest-jungle-refugee-camp-not-racist-problem-getting-worse〉.
Zeid urges Czech Republic to stop detention of migrants and refugees (2015). Retrieved from 〈http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=16632 & LangID=E〉.
S. Grigonis International Comparative Jurisprudence 2 (2016) 93–98
98
